بۆ ناوەڕۆک بازبدە

قوربانیانی شەڕی عێراق

لە ئینسایکڵۆپیدیای ئازادی ویکیپیدیاوە

خەمڵاندنەکانی قوربانیانی شەڕی عێراق (لە لەشکرکێشی عێراق لە ساڵی ٢٠٠٣ دەستی پێکردووە، و دواتر داگیرکاری و یاخیبوون و شەڕی ناوخۆ) بە چەندین شێوە ھاتووە؛ ئەم خەمڵاندنانە بۆ جۆرە جیاوازەکانی قوربانیانی شەڕی عێراق زۆر جیاوازییان ھەیە.

خەمڵاندنی کوژراوانی جەنگ چەندین ئاڵنگاری (تەحەدا) دەورووژێنێت.[١] [٢] پسپۆڕان جیاوازی دەکەن لە نێوان توێژینەوەکانی بنەمادار بە دانیشتووان، کە لە نموونەی ھەڕەمەکی دانیشتووان وەرگیراون، و ژمارەی لاشەکان، کە مردنەکان ڕاپۆرت دەکەن و ئەگەری زۆرە کە قوربانییەکان کەم بکەنەوە.[٣] توێژینەوە لەسەر بنەمای دانیشتووان خەمڵاندن بۆ ژمارەی قوربانیانی شەڕی عێراق دەکەن؛ ئەوەش لە ١٥١ ھەزار مردن بەھۆی توندووتیژیەوە لە مانگی حوزەیرانی ٢٠٠٦ەوە (بەپێی ڕاپرسی تەندروستی خێزانیی عێراق) تا ١٫٠٣٣٫٠٠٠ مردنی زیادە (بەپێی ڕاپرسی پرۆژەی توێژینەوەی بیرووڕا بۆ ساڵی ٢٠٠٧). توێژینەوەکانی دیکە لەسەر بنەمای ڕاپرسی کە ماوەی کاتیی جیاواز دەگرێتەوە دەریانخستووە کە کۆی ژمارەی مردنەکان ٤٦١ ھەزار کەسە (کە زیاتر لە ٦٠٪یان توندوتیژ بوون)، کە تا مانگی حوزەیرانی ٢٠١١ بوو. (بەپێی گۆڤاری PLOS)، ٦٥٥ ھەزار مردن (زیاتر لە ٩٠٪یان توندوتیژ)، لە مانگی حوزەیرانی ٢٠٠٦ (بەپێی لێکۆڵینەوەیەکی لانسێت لە ساڵی ٢٠٠٦) بوو.

تا مانگی نیسانی ٢٠٠٩ لایەنیکەم ١١٠ ھەزار و ٦٠٠ تەرمی بە توندووتیژی کوژراون (بەپێی ئاژانسی ئەسۆشێتد پرێس). پرۆژەی ژماردنی تەرمی عێراق لە خشتەی خۆیاندا تا مانگی شووباتی ٢٠٢٠ لە نێوان ١٨٥ بۆ ٢٠٨ ھەزار گیانلەدەستدانی توندووتیژی ھاووڵاتی مەدەنی تۆمار دەکات. ھەموو خەمڵاندنەکانی قوربانیانی شەڕی عێراق ڕووبەڕووی ھەندێک مشتومڕ دەبنەوە.[٤] [٥]

سەرچاوەکان[دەستکاری]

  1. ^ Wang, Haidong (8–14 October 2014). "Global, regional, and national life expectancy, all-cause mortality, and cause-specific mortality for 249 causes of death, 1980–2015: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015". The Lancet. 388 (10053). doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31012-1. PMC 5388903. PMID 27733281. Indeed, it has been challenging to accurately document the number of casualties from wars and deaths resulting from malnutrition, infections, or disruption in health services during wars.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
  2. ^ Adhikari, Neill KJ (16–22 October 2010). "Critical care and the global burden of critical illness in adults". The Lancet. 376 (9749). doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60446-1. PMC 7136988. PMID 20934212. However, during times of war, we should remember that evidence from systematic household cluster sampling suggests that most excess deaths, and, by extension, most demands for intensive care, do not arise from violence but from medical disorders resulting from the breakdown of public health infrastructure (eg, cholera), or from the discontinuation of treatment of chronic diseases caused by interruption of pharmaceutical supplies.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
  3. ^ Tapp, Christine (7 March 2008). "Iraq War mortality estimates: A systematic review". Conflict and Health. 2 (1). doi:10.1186/1752-1505-2-1. PMC 2322964. PMID 18328100. Of the population-based studies, the Roberts and Burnham studies provided the most rigorous methodology as their primary outcome was mortality. Their methodology is similar to the consensus methods of the SMART initiative, a series of methodological recommendations for conducting research in humanitarian emergencies. [...] However, not surprisingly their studies have been roundly criticized given the political consequences of their findings and the inherent security and political problems of conducting this type of research. Some of these criticisms refer to the type of sampling, duration of interviews, the potential for reporting bias, the reliability of its pre-war estimates, and a lack of reproducibility. The study authors have acknowledged their study limitations and responded to these criticisms in detail elsewhere. They now also provide their data for reanalysis to qualified groups for further review, if requested. [...] The IBC was largely established as an activist response to US refusals to conduct mortality counts. This account, however, is problematic as it relies solely on news reports that would likely considerably underestimate the total mortality.
  4. ^ Hagopian, Amy; Flaxman, Abraham D.; Takaro, Tim K.; Esa Al Shatari, Sahar A.; Rajaratnam, Julie; Becker, Stan; Levin-Rector, Alison; Galway, Lindsay; Hadi Al-Yasseri, Berq J. (October 15, 2013). "Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003–2011 War and Occupation: Findings from a National Cluster Sample Survey by the University Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study". PLOS Medicine. 10 (10). doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001533. PMC 3797136. PMID 24143140.
  5. ^ Levy, Barry S.; Sidel, Victor W. (March 2016). "Documenting the Effects of Armed Conflict on Population Health". Annual Review of Public Health. 37. doi:10.1146/annurev-publhealth-032315-021913. PMID 26989827. Although the Roberts and Burnham studies faced some criticism in the news media and elsewhere, part of which may have been politically motivated, these studies have been widely viewed among peers as the most rigorous investigations of Iraq War–related mortality among Iraqi civilians; we agree with this assessment and believe that the Hagopian study is also scientifically rigorous. Although the methodology and results in the four studies cited here have varied somewhat, it is clear that the Iraq War caused, directly and indirectly, a very large number of deaths among Iraqi civilians—which, in fact, may have been underestimated by these scientifically conservative studies. A paper by Tapp and colleagues and a recent report by three country affiliates of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have extensively reviewed these four epidemiological studies as well as other studies that attempted to assess the impact of the Iraq War on morbidity and mortality.